On the Issue of Supreme Authority in Islam by Dr. Stanislav Prozorov

The issue of supreme authority has been and still remains one of the key problems in the theory and practice of Islam. It was precisely this problem of authority that led to the partition of the early Muslim community into Kharijites, Shi‘ites, and Sunnites, which had an enormous impact on the formation of the religious-political ideology of Islam and on the political destiny of the entire Islamic world. Various interpretations of the nature of authority (hukm) took shape over time as principally different doctrines of supreme authority. Kharijites insisted on communal rule and the unconditional election of the head of the community; shi‘ites supported the divine nature of authority predetermined in the dynasty of caliph ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib (656-661); the middle path between collective and divine sources of authority was presented by the theory and practice of Sunnites, who formally recognised the elective nature of the head of the community-state, but limited the circle of candidates to the kin of Prophet Muhammad (Al Muhammad).1 The history of the Islamic world bears witness to continued attempts to realise different models of supreme rule in practice.

An essential part of the issue of supreme authority in Islam is the correlation between religion and secularism, religious conviction and politics. Due to historical conditions (in particular, the theocratic nature of the rule of the Prophet Muhammad) Islam as a religious system has acquired characteristic features distinct from other religions. Among them is the indivisibility of religion and politics, dogma and law. From this stems the multi-faceted role of Islam in Muslim societies, as well as its structural diversity, apparent in all spheres of social life. The practice of the Prophet Muhammad (Sunna) based on the unity of the religious and secular branches of power has been always manifested as an ideal “Islamic rule” (al-wilaya al-islamiya). The theocratic-authoritarian character of the Prophet Muhammad’s rule was expressed through the concentration of all authoritative social functions in his hands. He was not only a prophet, the supreme religious authority providing guidance for spiritual aspects of life in the Muslim community (umma) on behalf of Allah, but also a military commander, arbiter, treasurer, etc. Yet after the death of the Prophet Muhammad, who ruled over the community by the direct order of Allah (through the Revelations – wahy), the community was headed by men (khulafa’), who neither possessed nor claimed to possess such divine guidance. It became clear to the followers (sahaba) of the Prophet Muhammad that worldly affairs would be managed by a civil authority: the ruler-amir. Disputes between the Meccan and Medinan followers of the Prophet – muhajirs and ansars – concerned only which of them would be chosen amir. The election of Abu Bakr as-Siddiq (632-634) as caliph – “deputy Messenger of Allah” (khalifat rasul Allah) bears witness to this. The division of authoritative functions (court, finance) and their distribution among other mukhajirs also took place at that time.

With the Prophet Muhammad’s death (in 632) the prophecy (nubuwwa; he – khatim al-anbiya’, “The Seal of the prophets”) ceased, and with it, theocratic rule. In fact, a division of power occurred.

The image of Muhammad as a prophet and ideal ruler inspired Muslims to collect and interpret information about his words and deeds (hadith) and promoted the study of the divine Revelation (al-Qur’an), which led to the formation of a class of religious authorities – muhaddiths, qaris, mufassirs (Qur’an readers and commentators) and faqihs. It was these Muslim theologians and jurists (‘ulama’), not caliphs, who formed public opinion on religious matters.

The confrontation between the two branches of power continued throughout almost the enitre history of Islam – theologians attempted to subordinate caliphs, while the latter, on their side, strove to control religious affairs. Formally, caliphs symbolised the unity of religious and secular authority, but in fact they did not have a real impact on the religious aspect of public life. This was proved by the unsuccessful attempts of the ‘Abbasid caliphs al-Ma’mun (813-833, with interruption) and al-Qadir (991-1031) to legalise certain systems of dogma in the ‘Abbasid Caliphate (750-1258). In spite of the universal Islamic ideal of the unity of religious and secular rule, the paths of religion and state in fact diverged.

The idea of the indivisibility of spiritual and secular authority concentrated in the hands of the Muslim community’s leader (amir al-mu’minin) was more consistently defended for centuries by shi‘ites, who believed in the divine nature of authority and the divine selection of its possessor. The doctrine of the Imamate as a supreme authority, consisting of the principal regulations of shi‘ia dogmas, is preached as well by modern ideologists of “Islamic rule.” The latter is considered as a sort of “matrimonial union” of religion and policy, secured and legalised by Allah and therefore indissoluble. In essence, “Islamic rule” is an attempt to introduce an ideal model of theocratic rule, following the example of the rule of the Prophet Muhammad.

Considering the rise of propaganda of the idea of an Islamic “revival” and the establishment of “Islamic rule” in Muslim countries, including Central Asia,2 it is particularly relevant to note that social stability in these societies, to no small degree, depends upon a reasonable balance between religious authority as represented by the local traditional clergy (‘ulama’) and secular authority. The history of Islam bears witness to the fact that forms of interaction between religious and secular authority in different regions of the Islamic world vary due to natural differences in levels of historical self-consciousness among Muslim nations, and in their cultural, social and judicial, including governmental-legal, traditions. A particular feature of Islam is the diversity of its ideological forms, the so-called limited pluralism caused by the very close connection of Islamic culture with the spiritual substratum of Islamicised nations, with their particular religious and cultural traditions, social and legal institutions. Islam has taken root in many large historical and cultural regions in such form, in which it has adapted the religious-ethical ideas, legal norms, customs and cultural traditions of the local inhabitants.3 Attempts of Islamic “purists” to establish in the Muslim societies of the so-called “peripheral” regions “Islamic” models, formed in other cultural regions under distinct historical conditions, inevitably have a confrontational character. From the scientific point of view, it is unjustified to put “pure Islamic” traditions in opposition to local Islamic customs; moreover, from the general political view it is even fraught with dangerous conflicts, destabilising ethnic-religious relations in Muslim countries with a multiethnic structure of population. The absence of objective criteria in defining the model of “pure” Islam provides an ideological argument for the equivalence and self-sufficiency of regional forms of Islamic practice, including the choice of the form of supreme authority.

An alternative to the ideology of religious political extremism, which can find a breeding ground in the low level of religious knowledge among Muslims, can be the revival of national culture and the dissemination of authentic information about the history of Islam and the different forms of its existence.3 In turn, this will lead to the growth of historical self-consciousness and self-sufficiency of local traditional forms of Islam, as well as to an increased immunity for Muslims against the ideas of religious-political extremism.

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^*** The author of this article is publishing an encyclopedic dictionary, dedicated to studying regional forms of Islamic practice on the territory of the former Russian Empire – Eastern Europe, Bashkortostan, Tatarstan, Caucasus, Central Asia: Islam na territorii b vshey Rossiyskoy imperii. Entsiklopedicheskiy slovar’. 1^st-3^rd issues. Edited by S.M.  Prozorov. Moscow: Publishing Company “Vostochnaya literatura”, Russian Academy of Sciences, 1998-2001.

¹ For more details see: Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Karim al-Shahrastani. Kniga o religiyakh i sektakh [The book on religions and sects]. Part 1. Islam. Introduction, translation and commentaries of S.M. Prozorov. Moscow, 1984.

²  Prozorov S.M. From the editor, in: Islam na territorii b vshey Rossiyskoy imperii. Entsiklopedicheskiy slovar’. 1^st issue. Moscow, 1998, pp. 4-9.

3 About the forms of existing Islamic practice in Central Asia see: Muminov A. Centralnaya Aziya, in: Islam na territorii b vshey Rossiyskoy imperii. Entsiklopedicheskiy slovar’. 1^st issue. Moscow, 1998, pp. 102-105; Meskhidze J. Checheno-Ingushetiya, in: ibid, 1^st issue, pp. 105-108; Jandosova Z. Kazakhstan, in: item, 3^d issue, pp. 47-52; Mukhametshin R. Tatarstan, in: ibid, 3^d issue, pp. 100-103; Demidov S. Turkmenistan, in: ibid, 3^d issue, pp. 104-107.