Islam in Post-Soviet Central Asia by Prof., Dr. Shirin Akiner

(This article was The Search For A Rational Balance Between Religiosity And Secularity In The Post-Soviet Muslim States)

Post-Soviet Islam

When the Central Asian states gained independence at the end of 1991 there was much speculation, within the region and abroad, as to the possible impact of the “Islamic factor” on politics and society. The outbreak of civil strife in Tajikistan in 1992 seemed to many to be proof positive that a wave of rampant “Islamic fundamentalism” had been unleashed in the region. The opposing Tajik factions were described as “Islamists” and “neo-Communists”, and the conflict was depicted in terms of a religious war. As the situation unfolded, however, a more complex picture emerged. Islam was undoubtedly a factor, but by no means the sole cause of the conflict. Rather, it was an aggravating feature in the struggle for power that broke out between the different regional groupings as soon as Moscow’s grip weakened2 . Despite fears of an over-spill effect, the experience of Tajikistan was not repeated in the other states.

Nevertheless, the theory that the “Islamic factor” is the key to the politics of Central Asia is still widely held. Yet any serious debate of the issue is greatly impeded by the fact that very little concrete information is available. In the few instances where field research has been carried out, it has been based on relatively small samples. There are huge regional variations in the historical experience of Islam, as well as in contemporary socio-economic indicators (for example, levels of urbanisation, rates of demographic increase, educational standards, geographic mobility and ethnic heterogeneity). Consequently, it would be misleading to make sweeping generalisations on the basis of such a narrow range of evidence.

To complicate matters further, researchers who have worked in the same area, at approximately the same period, often come to very different conclusions. Given these problems, it is virtually impossible to gain a comprehensive overview of the situation. Nevertheless, some common trends can be identified, though they vary in scope and intensity from state to state, and also from area to area within a single state. They represent an evolution of the tendencies that emerged in the 1980s, but in a more intense and segmented form. They fall into three main categories; these can be described as “traditional” Islam, “government-sponsored” Islam and “radical” Islam. 

The term “traditional” Islam is used here to describe the conservative, overall rather passive attitude to religion that continues to characterise the outlook of the great majority of Central Asian Muslims. As most observers would agree (including fellow Muslims from abroad), Islam here is still perceived more as an ethnic definition than as a religious allegiance. There is a strong sense of obligation “to maintain the traditions of forefathers”. This may be expressed in a variety of ways, encompassing different degrees of religious observance. For a few, it involves a strict performance of the prescribed rituals. Others tend to affirm their Islamic identity in a more cursory, symbolic fashion. Moreover, there is still great attachment to popular practices which, though understood as being Islamic, are contrary to orthodox teachings. Yet whatever the level or form of active participation in religion, the emphasis tends to be on preserving continuity rather than searching for enlightenment, or for a deeper understanding of the faith. 

This situation may be changing, albeit slowly. In the immediate aftermath of independence there was a great upsurge of enthusiasm for mosque construction. In Kyrgyzstan, for example, there were only 34 mosques open for worship in 1987, but about 1000 in 1994; in Uzbekistan, in the same period, the number rose from 87 to 3,000 3 . The same phenomenon was to be observed in the other Central Asian states. Moreover, many Muslim schools and madrasas were opened and courses were provided for children and adults in the study of Arabic, the Qur’an, and related religious topics. 

The physical closeness of places of worship encouraged people to attend services on a regular basis and in the early 1990s mosque congregations grew rapidly. By about 1994, however, the novelty was beginning to wear off and a marked drop in attendance was to be observed throughout the region. Since then, there appears to have been a gradual recovery, particularly in the south. Some researchers claim that this is happening mainly in villages, among males in the 17 to 25 year-old age group. Others insist that it is more typical of traders and businessmen in urban areas, i.e. the emerging entrepreneurial class. University students are also said to be showing an interest in the faith4 . There are no corroborated statistics available on this trend, so it is impossible to judge how strong or how widespread it is, but that there is some shift in this direction seems to be beyond dispute. 

Government-sponsored Islam 

“Government-sponsored” Islam in post-Soviet Central Asia is a continuation of the attempt to co-opt religion to serve the needs of the state that marked official policies towards Islam in the late 1980s. Today, the Constitutions of all the Central Asian countries enshrine the principle of the division of religion and state. Yet throughout the region Islam has been elevated to a status akin to that of a state ideology. This seems to have been prompted by the conviction that unless urgent action was taken to fill the ideological vacuum left by the discrediting of Marxism-Leninism, anarchy would
follow. Consequently, in all the Central Asian states an immediate campaign was set in motion to emphasise the role of Islam as an integral component of the national heritage, and likewise of the ethical foundation of the national state. This message was conveyed through the teachings of Muslim clerics, as well as through the pronouncements of senior political figures, and editorial and documentary features in the mass media. 

Since independence, new laws on religion and on religious associations have been passed in the Central Asian states. The law adopted in Uzbekistan in 1998 is regarded as the most restrictive. However, the draft amendments that are currently under consideration in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan propose measures that are almost equally as severe. Political parties of a religious orientation are proscribed everywhere except in Tajikistan, where in mid-1999, in the run-up to parliamentary elections, the Islamic Rebirth Party, outlawed in 1993, was again legalised. 

The form of Islam favoured by the Central Asian governments of today is based on the teachings of orthodox Sunnite Islam of the Hanafite school of jurisprudence. However, the sphere of application is strictly limited. There is little question, for example, of introducing elements of shari‘a law (Muslim canon law) into the legal framework of these states. Whereas under Soviet rule there had been a unified, overarching administration for all the Muslims of the region (the Muslim Spiritual Board of Central Asia and Kazakhstan), separate national administrations, each headed by a Mufti, were established in the early 1990s 5 . The Muftiat is responsible for administering Muslim affairs within the state, and maintaining formal contacts with Muslims abroad. The work of the Muftiat is monitored by a Committee for Religious Affairs, a body that serves as the interface between the government and the religious organisations. The interests of Muslims as well as adherents of the other established faiths - chiefly Orthodox Christianity and Judaism - are officially represented in this body. The “non-traditional” faiths such as Bahais, Pentecostals, Jehovah’s Witnesses, are regarded with suspicion and have little opportunity for official representation. In Turkmenistan, the Muftiat and the Committee have virtually merged into a single entity, as the Chairman of the latter body is the Deputy Mufti, while the Mufti is Deputy Chairman of the Committee. 

Radical Islam 

The third trend in Central Asian Islam, here categorised as “radical”, embraces a loose grouping of activists who want to purge Islam of the distortions that have been introduced over time. They are referred to as “Wahhabis”, a term that today, as previously, is a generic expression of abuse rather than a adequate description of religious affiliation of these groups. The purging of radical elements from the state-controlled Muslim bodies has broken the tacit alliance that existed at the end of the Soviet period between the “purists” (“Wahhabis”) and the official religious hierarchy. This has left the former in a very vulnerable, isolated position. They have reacted by adopting a stance that is aggressively antagonistic, their ire targeted equally against folk interpretations of Islam as well as compromised government-sponsored Islam. For its part, the official hierarchy is now implacably ranged against the radicals. By contrast, the traditionalists are regarded with greater equanimity. Thus, since independence there has been a tactical realignment amongst the Muslims, with the traditionalists and the representatives of government institutions reaching a degree of accommodation, united by their opposition to the radicals. 

In the last few years the radicals have attained considerable notoriety. It is impossible to set a figure either to the number of individuals who are involved, or to the number of separate groups. It is equally impossible to gauge how much popular support they enjoy, but to the extent that publicly expressed opinions can be trusted, the prevalent attitude towards them in the society seems to be extremely negative. Names of some of these groups appear in the press from time to time, but with almost no background information. Most seem to be relatively new (scarcely any are mentioned in sources prior to 1994). However, where it is possible to trace the biographies of the leaders of these groups, and likewise the genealogy of their ideas, it is obvious that they emanate from Soviet-era revivalist circles6 . 

The two groups that are currently mentioned most frequently are the “Hizb al-tahrir”, and the “Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan”.7 The former is an international organisation established in 1952/53 in Jerusalem8 ; it is now active in the Russian Federation and other parts of the CIS. The latter is a local group, based predominantly in the Ferghana Valley (eastern Uzbekistan and bordering regions of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan). It is impossible, given the dearth of reliable information, to establish the degree to which they are linked. Initially, they seem to have been quite separate organisations, but there are rumours that by the end of the 1990s some degree of rapprochement had taken place. “Hizb al-tahrir” seems to be the larger group; such evidence as there is suggests that it has a regional membership of several thousand. It also appears to have a fairly strong, cell-based organisational structure, an energetic recruitment policy, and a strategic training programme. 

Problem of terrorism 

The main geographic centre of activity has been Namangan, a densely populated Uzbek province in the Ferghana valley with a reputation, even during the Soviet period, for being a bastion of Islam. During the presidential elections of 1991 several peaceful demonstrations were held here calling for the establishment of an Islamic state. A party of Islamic activists called “‘Adalat” (“Justice”) was created that same year, chiefly, as it was alleged, with the aim of combating crime. The party received some support from the authorities at this time. Within a few months, however, the main ringleaders had been arrested. 

On 16 February 1999 there was an attempt on the life of President Karimov in Tashkent, the capital of Uzbekistan. Within hours of the incident, ‘Islamic fundamentalists’ were being blamed for the outrage. This time, however, accusations of plotting to kill the president were also levelled at the leaders, now living abroad, of “Erk” (“Freedom”) and “Birlik” (“Unity”), opposition parties. 

The possibility that the terrorists who carried out the attack were fired by a desire to establish an Islamic state in Uzbekistan should not be ruled out. 

Violent incidents continue to proliferate. The most serious clash to date was in the summer of 1999. Armed fighters crossed into Kyrgyzstan in August of that year, with the aim, according to official sources, of invading Uzbekistan “in order to establish an Islamic state”. Estimates of the size of this troop vary greatly, but it seems likely to have numbered somewhat under 500 men. There were similar armed clashes in the same area in mid-2000, though on a smaller scale. Contrary to expectations, however, there were no such assaults in 2001 or 2002. 

The August 1999 insurgency was a new departure, a ratcheting up of pressure from isolated acts of terrorism to a sustained, relatively large-scale operation. There is no information as to why such an attack was launched at precisely this juncture. Ostensibly, the action was prompted by the Tajik government’s decision to expel some 700-1000 Uzbek guerrillas, allegedly members of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, from bases that they had established in Tajikistan. It may, too, have been retaliation for the repression that followed the February bombing in Tashkent. The possibility that field commanders and/or foreign sponsors judged that the men had reached a sufficient level of combat readiness for it to be feasible to mount such an operation should also not be excluded. By some accounts, the combatants were armed with sophisticated modern weapons9 . 

External influences 

It has sometimes been suggested that the Islamic revival in the Central Asian states is inspired and supported by Muslims in other countries. There is some element of truth in this. Some of the finance for the building of mosques and madrasahs, as also for the restoration of Islamic monuments, has come from abroad, from private sources, as well as from government funds. Students from Central Asia have gone in quite large numbers (a few hundred a year) to study in countries such as Turkey, Egypt and Pakistan. Since independence many thousands of Central Asians have performed the pilgrimage to Mecca, some already two or three times. In the early 1990s the travel expenses of several thousand pilgrims were covered by the Saudi monarch, and again in 1999. All the Central Asian states have now joined the Organisation for Islamic Conference (OIC), hence there are also institutional links with the Muslim world. 

The main foreign influence, however, has come from missionaries. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union they flocked to Central Asia from many parts of the Muslim world to preach and to open schools. At first they were warmly welcomed. Gradually, though, the mood in the region began to change. On the one hand, the “traditionalists” – the mass of ordinary believers - objected to being told that some of their most respected customs (for example, those connected with burials) were not authentic and should be replaced by more orthodox procedures. On the other hand, the state authorities also became uneasy that the missionaries were encouraging “independent Islamic thought”. Uzbekistan was the first to impose restrictions on Muslim missionaries from abroad. In 1992-93 some 50 Saudi preachers were expelled. Other expulsions followed and since then the activities of foreign Muslims have been very carefully monitored. A similar tendency is to be observed in the other states. Foreign commentators initially expected that Iran would play the lead role in the re-Islamicisation of Central Asia. In fact, Iranian clerics have been conspicuous largely by their absence. After the collapse of the Soviet Union delegations from Iran began to visit the Central Asian states and to acquire firsthand familiarity with the region. They soon realised that an Islamic revolution along the lines of the Iranian model was not a realistic prospect for Central Asia; this was partly because of the very low level of knowledge of Islam among the population at large, but also, and very importantly, because of the lack of a trained, independent-minded ‘ulama’. The fact that the Iranians represent the Shi‘a tradition also placed them at a disadvantage. By contrast, Sunnite Muslim missionaries were active from the first years of independence. Turkish Muslims have played the most prominent role. Proportionately, they are more numerous than any other ethnic group. In Kyrgyzstan, for example, in 1999, according to official statistics, they numbered 55, a third of all the foreign Muslim missionaries in the country; missionaries from Pakistan, the second largest group, accounted for less than 40 10. 

The great majority of the Turkish missionaries are Nurcus, followers of Bedi‘üzzaman Sa‘id Nursî (1876-1960), and of his disciple Fath Allah Gülen11. The Nurcus opened many schools and commercial enterprises in all the Central Asian states. They appeared to be propagating a moderate, modernised version of Islam. Their teaching programs concentrated on scientific subjects and technical skills. However, on a more informal level, through extra-curricula contacts and through the distribution of translations into the local languages of the “Risala-yi Nur” (“The Epistle of Light”), the corpus of teachings of Sa‘id Nursî, they seem to have been disseminating a more radical message. There are increasing concerns that their ultimate political project is the creation of an Islamic state. They are also accused by some of having a pan-Turkic agenda. Because of such suspicions, their newspaper “Zaman” (“Time”) was banned in Uzbekistan in 1994; several teachers were expelled at about the same time. In other Central Asian states a similar sense of unease is emerging regarding the activities of this group and consequently, their work is now being more closely monitored. 

Another way in which Turkish influence has been significant is in the revival of Sufism. Great Sufi orders such as the Naqshbandiya and Qadiriya were influential in Central Asia in the past, but even before the Soviet era they had for the most part been reduced to the level of Ishanism (a syncretic, popular form of mysticism, centred on local, often hereditary, spiritual leaders)12. In the twentieth century this form of worship continued to attract adherents, but was far removed from the esoteric doctrines and practices of classical Sufism. In the early 1990s, adepts from Turkey began to re-introduce Sufism to the region, focusing their efforts mainly on Uzbekistan and southern Kazakhstan. Initially, this was welcomed by the secular authorities in Uzbekistan, who professed admiration for Sufi philosophy. 

Later, however, the Uzbek government’s attitude towards this trend changed. Sufism continued to be revered as a historical and cultural phenomenon, but attempts to revive Sufi brotherhoods were firmly repressed. 

Fears that foreign Muslims are fomenting religious extremism and militancy in Central Asia continue to grow. The enthusiasm for sending students to Islamic institutions in Turkey, Egypt and other Muslim countries is now being tempered with concerns that once abroad, they will be exposed to radical ideas. The Uzbek authorities were the first to react to this perceived threat, going so far as to accuse Turkish Islamists of using these students as a fifth column. It was alleged that while in Turkey several of these students underwent ‘terrorist training’. Other governments in the region have also become suspicious of the education offered by foreign Muslims. In October 2000 President Nazarbayev ordered the recall of all Kazakh students studying in Islamic institutions abroad13. 

When trying to assess the vitality of Islamic movements in post-Soviet Central Asia it is important to consider the extent to which there is a competition of ideas and influences. Certainly, these states are no longer as isolated as they once were. Improved communications and information technologies, as well as opportunities to work and study in other countries, are broadening horizons, particularly for the younger generation. Moreover, a diversity of faiths and denominations are now represented in the region. These include organisations such as the Aga Khan Development Network, which, among its various projects provides training for Isma‘ili Muslims (traditionally based in Badakhshan), as well as non-sectarian educational opportunities for the wider Central Asian population. On a smaller scale, Ahmadiyya groups seek converts to their version of Islam (which orthodox Muslims regard as heretical). 

There are also many dynamic Christian missions; several of the evangelical Protestant sects are financially well-endowed. In Kyrgyzstan in 1999, for example, there were 402 registered Christian missionaries, over twice the total number of Muslim missionaries; well over half the Christians were from Korea14. Some of the ethnic Central Asians, particularly Kyrgyz and Kazakhs, are converting to these sects in substantial numbers. New faiths such as Hare Krishnaism, Scientology and the cults of various Indian gurus are also attracting followers. Thus, there is today a greater degree of religious heterogeneity than was the case a decade ago. Yet Islam in Central Asia is not only a religion, it is also a cultural and social identity; hence, at the popular level, apostasy is often greeted with anger and bewilderment. The state authorities, too, are suspicious of foreign proselytisers, regarding their activities as akin to a threat to national security. 

Wider Trends 

Attitudes and responses to Islam in post-Soviet Central Asia have been shaped by a traumatic history of fracture and rupture, beginning with the introduction of Tsarist colonial rule in the nineteenth century, followed by seventy years of Soviet rule and intensive secularisation in the twentieth century, and culminating in sudden independence on the eve of the twenty first century. These experiences have created a complex pattern of cultural and social transformations. In some ways this legacy is unique. Yet, when considered within the context of the larger Islamic world, it emerges that many of the dilemmas that face Central Asians today are by no means unfamiliar elsewhere. It is beyond the scope of this paper to make detailed comparisons between the Central Asian states and states with Muslim majorities in other parts of the world. However, there are points of similarity that are worth noting. 

One issue is government control of Islamic institutions. This is common practice in many member states of the OIC. Moreover, in some of these states, leaders consciously draw on Islamic rhetoric and symbolism to validate their regimes. Thus, manipulation of Islam, far from being a Central Asian phenomenon, is very much within the experience of the modern Islamic world. 

A second issue is opposition to incumbent regimes from Islamic movements. This is a widespread phenomenon, not only in OIC states in the Middle East, but also in south and south-east Asia and in Africa. In some countries, incumbent governments have been prepared to accommodate a degree of dialogue with such organisations (for example, in Jordan and Malaysia). However, successful examples of power-sharing within the Islamic world are few. In most places, the response has been one of harsh repression (as, for example, in Egypt and Algeria). 

A third, and related, issue concerns divergent interpretations of Islam. Within the spectrum of contemporary Islamic thought there are two main strands. One is represented by those who believe that Islamic values and principles need to be re-interpreted so as to be relevant to modern life, the other by those who insist on a full and literal implementation of the precepts of the Qur’an and the traditions of the Prophet (Sunna). These strands are referred to here as “reformist” and “radical” respectively15. 

In Central Asia, too, these strands are emerging16. The reformist strand is very weak, indeed, scarcely perceptible. The chief proponent is President Karimov. He is conscious of a need to emphasise the fundamental values of Islam17. The radical strand conforms to a pattern of behaviour that is typical of Muslim radicals elsewhere. This is characterised by withdrawal from a society that they see as decadent and ignorant of Islam (jahiliya), and by the waging of a “righteous struggle” (jihad) against those they regard as “religious hypocrites” (munafiqun) and “unbelievers” (kafirun, kuffar). 

Islamic Literature 

For the overwhelming majority, Islam is sacred and immutable, not to be subjected to rational inquiry or argument. There are no home-grown Muslim thinkers expounding a coherent vision of Islam. Equally, there is virtually no awareness of the existence of contemporary thought in other parts of the Islamic world. The writings of Muhammad Arkoun, Rashid al-Ghannouchi, Taha Husayn, Abu-l-‘Ala’ Mawdudi, Sayyid Qutb, Fazlur Rahman, Ziya’ Sardar and ‘Ali Shari‘ati, to mention but a handful, are unknown. Admittedly, such works are not readily available in libraries or bookshops in Central Asia; also, for many there would be a language barrier, as very little of this material (in Arabic, English, French and Persian) has been translated into Russian, still less into any Central Asian language. It is, however, noteworthy, that even educated Muslims show an almost total absence of curiosity regarding modern debates on Islam. 

Literature that is available is that which is produced by “Hizb al-tahrir”. The authorities in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan report that large consignments of the party’s journal “al-Wa‘y” (“Consciousness”), as well as leaflets and books, have been circulated in recent years. Titles of confiscated material include “Islam nizami” (“The Islamic Order”), “Hizb al-tahrir tushunchalari” (“Concepts of “Hizb al-tahrir”) and “Siyasat va khalqara siyasat” (“Politics and International Politics”); these texts are sometimes in Arabic, sometimes in competent Kyrgyz or Uzbek translations. Several underground printing presses have been discovered. Local editions of such works are said to have been produced in print runs of 1,000 or so. Distribution of such material was mostly covert: typically, copies were scattered in public places under cover of night, or handed out by casual hired labour18. Thus, it is very difficult to judge how much, if any of it, is actually read by the population at large. 

Conclusions 

The brief comparison given above of trends in the Islamic world indicates that although the Central Asian situation has particular characteristics, it is not unique. The fundamental challenge for Muslims here, as elsewhere, is how to reconcile Islam with modernity – a modernity that is rooted in a non-Islamic philosophy, and overwhelmingly dominated by the achievements, needs and ambitions of Western powers19. It is a challenge that today is made all the more immediate by such pressures as the globalisation of economic interdependence, the internationalisation of concepts of good governance and the ubiquitous reach of a popular culture that undermines traditional values. Yet it is not a new phenomenon: for well over a century Muslim thinkers have been seeking to resolve this dilemma. Some have tried to overcome the perceived weakness and backwardness of Muslim societies by advocating a limited synthesis of Islamic and Western norms in such fields as education and law. Others have sought to generate a more comprehensive “transformation of a (Muslim) intellectual tradition”20, an equivalent of Western Europe’s historic experience of Reformation and Enlightenment. 

Whatever successes this accommodating and assimilatory approach might have had, it did not significantly improve conditions for large sections of the population. There was continuing social and economic underdevelopment, with widespread poverty, corruption, exploitation, injustice and lack of access to basic social services. By the mid-twentieth century, some Muslims, disillusioned by what they regarded as “Westoxification” – the poisonous effects of Western influence – began to seek salvation in an idealised, ahistoric vision of “authentic” Islam. The Central Asians were isolated from this trend at that time. Now, they, too, are facing these same issues. The process is all the more painful here, in that during the Soviet period they achieved a level of development that was significantly higher than in most other parts of Asia. Since then, they have seen standards of living plummet. This, added to the sudden loss of an entire ideological system, has created a deep sense of disorientation. The high hopes of the first years of independence have for the most part not been fulfilled. In these conditions, it is not surprising that people crave guidance, certainty and above all, a faith that holds out the promise of a better future. 

Much of the commentary on Islam in Central Asia today focuses on the security implications of the emergence of a radical movement: might this be a threat to stability? have particular governments exaggerated, or alternatively, underestimated the seriousness of the situation? is there a nascent “arc of conflict” from China to the Black Sea? Such questions concentrate attention on individual events, but the lack of reliable information, makes it impossible to gauge the importance of such incidents with any degree of assurance. Meanwhile, there is little attempt to identify underlying trends. Yet it is these trends that are shaping the future. Arguably, one of the most significant developments of the 1990s has been the intensifying politicisation of Islam. This is not solely owing to the activities of radical groups: governments, too, have engaged in the contestation of Islamic legitimacy. This has placed Islam in the centre of the political arena. The discourse of opposition is now cast in doctrinal terms. Consequently, virtually all forms of political disaffection are subsumed under the umbrella of radical Islam. It might have been supposed that this would lead to a dilution of the purely religious content of the agenda. On the contrary, it appears to be assuming a yet more powerful role. Likewise, the involvement of criminal elements does not appear to be mitigating the fervour of the “righteous struggle”. 

There are other factors that might affect the course of events. One is economic recovery. This would undoubtedly help to alleviate some of the tensions. Nevertheless, it will not happen overnight. Moreover, if there were to be an improvement in the economy, it is by no means certain that all sectors of the population would benefit; were it to lead to greater inequalities in standards of living, greater societal fragmentation, this would surely deepen the crisis. Another factor that might help to create a benign momentum is the training that is being provided through international aid and development programmes. Such schemes make a positive contribution to the creation of more open, tolerant societies. Yet it would be premature to expect that they will make an impact in the near future. Most of these programmes are quite small in scope, duration and catchment area. Thus, it will take some considerable time to achieve critical mass. It will also take time for graduates of such schemes to reach positions of sufficient seniority to enable them to influence policy-making. A third factor that could eventually contribute to the creation of a more favourable environment are the projects on conflict prevention and conflict resolution that are being funded by international organisations. However, these are even more limited in scale than other training programmes, and in addition, are often not properly implemented owing to problems on the ground, such as obstructive officials and cumbersome bureaucratic procedures. More seriously, such projects are not always well designed and sometimes reveal little understanding of local conditions. 

It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that, at least in the short term, the Central Asian states will continue to experience severe societal stress. Economic collapse is triggering a process of de-modernisation and de-skilling, especially in rural areas (where the great majority of the indigenous population still live). It is not surprising that in these circumstances people welcome the comfort and the direction of religious faith. Nevertheless, it is important to keep the dimensions of this process in perspective. The great majority of the population continues to espouse a passive, traditionalist approach to Islam. They accept – or acquiesce in – the guidance of the official religious hierarchy. 

The radical Muslims are still very much a minority, both numerically, and in terms of geographic spread. Within the last three or so years they have fanned out from their original base in eastern Uzbekistan (Ferghana Valley) and now have a sizeable presence in the adjacent regions of the other four states. This process may well continue, but it will nevertheless be difficult to win over a substantial mass of the population. A separate, though possibly related phenomenon, is the emergence of a militant element. This involves even smaller numbers of individuals (probably hundreds rather than thousands), operating seasonally within a fairly narrow corridor from the Afghan border to eastern Uzbekistan. Doubtless they could expand their activities, especially if they are funded by drug trafficking and are receiving logistical and ideological support from extremist movements in Afghanistan, Pakistan and other parts of the Islamic world. However, they would find a formidable foe in the joint armed forces of Uzbekistan and the other Central Asian states21. Thus, although the incidence of violence might increase, it is unlikely that the present balance of power would be significantly altered in the foreseeable future.

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¹ The author of this article is a lecturer at the Royal School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London. The article was written in October 2002. Some sections of this paper have previously appeared in print in: the Harvard International Review. Spring 2000, Cambridge, Mass., pp. 62-64; also in: Strasser A., Haas S., Mangott G., Heuberger V. (eds.) Zentralasien und Islam. Deutsches Orient-Institut, Hamburg, 2002, pp. 73-101.

² The signing of the peace treaty between the warring Tajik factions in June 1997 did much to restore order to the country, though at the time of writing the situation remains fragile and a lasting settlement has yet to be achieved. See: Politics of compromise: the Tajikistan peace process. Edited by Abdullaev K., Barnes C. Series: Accord 10, Conciliation Resources. London, 2001; also: Akiner S. Tajikistan: Disintegration or Reconciliation? Royal Institute for International Affairs, London, 2001.

³ Trofimov D. Friday Mosques and their Imams in the Former Soviet Union, in: Religion, State and Society: the Keston Journal, vol. 24, N 2-3, June-September 1996, pp. 193-219. By 2000, the number of mosques in Uzbekistan had fallen to 1,700 (communication by Deputy Mufti of Uzbekistan, Vienna, 2000). However, all these estimates are approximate and should be treated with caution.

⁴ Seminar discussions at the UNESCO International Symposium “Culture and Religion in Central Asia”, Bishkek, 13-15 September 1999, in particular contributions by Anara Tabyshalieva (Institute of Regional Studies, Bishkek) and Erkeaim Zhorobekova (Osh University). See also Olimova S. Politicheskiy islam i konflikt v Tadzhikistane, in: Tsentral’naya Aziya i Kavkaz, N 4 (5), 1999, esp. pp. 136.

⁵ In Tajikistan the office of Mufti was abolished in 1996, following the murder of Mufti Fath Allah-khan Sharif-zada; the work of the Muftiat was also reorganised at that time. The chief Muslim authority is now the Chairman of the Council of ‘Ulama’ (currently Qari Aman Allah Ni‘mat-zada).

⁶ The best known figure is Jum‘a-bay Hajiyev, usually called “Jum‘a Namangani” or “Taji- bay”. Born in 1969, in the Namangan province of Uzbekistan, he served with the Soviet army in Afghanistan in 1988-89; on his return to Uzbekistan he became an active member of the Islamist movement. He fought in the Tajik civil war, undergoing a brief spell of military training in northern Afghanistan, then in Pakistan; he also visited Saudi Arabia. In 1997 he became the “commander in chief” of the so called “Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan”.

⁷ Other groups include the “Akramiya” (named after their founder, Akram Yuldashev), also known as the “Imanchilar” (“Believers”) or “Khalifatchilar” (“Caliphate Supporters”), the “Tawba” (“Repentance”) movement, and “Islam lashkarlari” (“Warriors of Islam”).

⁸ The founder was a leading Palestinian, Shaykh Taqi al-Din al-Nabhani (1909-1978), who, prior to partition, was a judge in the shari‘a court, Haifa; he later moved to Nablus. The party was banned almost immediately. Originally based in Jordan, it soon attracted members elsewhere in the Middle East and North Africa.

⁹ Personal communications to the author by Uzbek and Kyrgyz military-security personnel at a conference held in Tashkent, May 2000, under the auspices of the George Marshall Center for European Security and the Uzbek Ministry of Defence.

¹⁰  Personal communication by N. Shadrova, Deputy Chairman of the Kyrgyz State Committee on Religious Affairs, Bishkek, September, 1999.

¹¹               Sa‘id Nursî and Fath Allah Gülen have played an ambiguous role in Turkish politics. They and their followers have had close links with some Turkish politicians, but have been regarded with suspicion by others; they have, on occasion, been prosecuted. For a study of Nursî’s life and teachings, see Mardin Sh. The Case of Bediüzzaman Said Nursî: Religion and Social Change in Modern Turkey. State University of New York Press, Albany, 1989.

¹² See further Akiner Sh. Islam, the State and Ethnicity in Central Asia in Historical Perspective, Religion, State and Society, in: The Keston Journal, vol. 24, N 2-3 (1996), pp. 91-132, especially p. 95.

¹³ According to a press statement made by the Deputy Mufti of Kazakhstan, Serik Oraz, there were at this time about 100 students in Turkey, 80 in Egypt and 25 in Pakistan; these had been sent under the aegis of the Muftiat. Additionally, several students had gone abroad under other, private schemes.

¹⁴ Personal communication by N. Shadrova, Deputy Chairman of the Kyrgyz State Committee on Religious Affairs, Bishkek, September, 1999.

¹⁵ There is great terminological confusion over the designation of contemporary trends in Islam. There are also widely differing analyses. One of the most lucid discussions is provided by Choueiri Y.M. Islamic Fundamentalism (revised ed.). London, Washington, 1997. This is the model that is used here. He identifies the main trends thus: “Islamic reformism … a modern movement which came into being in the wake of European supremacy and expansion”, its main operative concepts including a rejection of medieval Islam and a reinterpretation of Islam as a code of modern laws; and “Islamic radicalism … a politico-cultural movement that postulates a qualitative contradiction between Western civilisation and the religion of Islam” (pp. 19, 122 respectively). For a different approach, using different terminological categories, see: Jansen G.H. Militant Islam. London, Sydney, 1979.

¹⁶ Or more precisely, the reformism trend is re-emerging: there was an embryonic reform (Jadidism) movement in Central Asia in the late nineteenth-early twentieth century; however, its development was arrested with the imposition of Soviet rule.

¹⁷ His comments on Islam are made in response to particular occurrences. See: Karimov I. Uzbekistan on the Threshold of the Twenty-First Century. London, 1997, pp. 85-94, where he sketches out his thoughts on “the revival of spiritual values and national self-awareness”. More revealing, perhaps, are his efforts to encourage the parallel study of secular subjects and Islam, as for example, in the new state “Tashkent Islamic University”.

¹⁸ Warning G. Propaganda und Prozesse gegen Hizbut-Tahrir, in: Erk info (e-mail distribution), 25 February 2001; Botobekov U. Hizb al-tahrir Challenges the Central Asia Ruling Regimes, in: Times of Central Asia, vol. 3, N 9, 1 March 2001.

¹⁹ Sadiq al-Mehdi, a former Prime Minister of Sudan, summed it up thus: ‘The modernisation which we witness today is called Western, yet its genesis involves an important contribution from the World of Islam, In the process of that evolution the phenomenon lost all or most of its spiritual and moral bearings. Today, backward and deprived, we face an economic and military giant with the moral and spiritual scruples of a flea. It is not a pleasant encounter”. See: Gauhar A. (ed.). The Challenge of Islam. Islamic Council of Europe. London, 1978, p. 119.

²⁰ Fazlur Rahman. Islam and Modernity: Transformation of an Intellectual Tradition. London, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1982.

²¹ The Uzbek and Kyrgyz armed forces have recently undergone major reorganisation so as to improve their ability to repulse insurgencies such as those of 1999 and 2000. They have also received military aid from a number of foreign governments (including China) that are anxious to curb the spread of Islamic militancy.